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New Strategy  
for  
*the Same Ends*

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An Analysis  
of Maoist International Policy

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■ The great-power, disruptive policy of the Peking leaders is causing serious damage to the interests of the world socialist system and the entire communist movement, impeding the anti-imperialist struggle of the progressive forces and exercising an adverse influence on the international situation. What is happening in China is being exploited by anti-communist propaganda in order to discredit scientific socialism and Marxism-Leninism as a whole.

The practical activity, political principles and pronouncements of the Chinese leadership in the current period have clearly shown that Mao Tsetung and his group are intent on following the basic political course endorsed by the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China. This means a rejection of the proletarian, class approach in assessing social phenomena, undermining the socialist community and the anti-imperialist front, frenzied anti-Sovietism and the endeavour to establish world hegemony.

But instead of bringing the Maoists the desired results, the attempts at a frontal and forceful implementation of this policy have deepened China's internal crisis and its isolation on the international arena. That is why the Maoists have recently been compelled, while keeping up their far-going hegemonic aims, to resort to manoeuvr-

ing. They are trying hard to make their policy look more respectable and less aggressive.

Ever since the Ninth Congress of the CPC, Mao Tse-tung and his supporters have been trying to complete the legalisation of the political upheaval brought about during the "cultural revolution," to bolster up their regime in China and gradually put into action their foreign policy aimed at achieving hegemonic aims.

In the sphere of the country's internal development, the chief task of the Maoists has been to overcome socio-economic instability and restore the prestige of the central government, which was shaken by the "cultural revolution." This has demanded that attention be confined to the problems of economic, Party and state construction. To a certain extent regulation of socio-political and economic activity is achieved, by means of all-round militarisation and by maintaining a "besieged fortress" atmosphere. The personality cult of Mao Tse-tung is being further boosted and there are endless demagogic claims that the Maoist "cultural revolution" was "absolutely necessary in order to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat," and that it gave "a powerful impetus to the economic, political, ideological and cultural development of the country." The outrages committed by the hungweipings, and the vicious mockery of hundreds of thousands of communists are said to have been caused by the "intrigues and provocations of Chairman Mao's enemies," meaning Liu Shao-chi and his adherents. This is all part of the Maoists' broad political manoeuvre aimed at stabilising the internal situation.

However, the process of relative stabilisation

is uneven and painful. The agitations of the "cultural revolution," particularly those connected with the major reshuffle in the Party and government, had not yet subsided when a new political crisis broke out in the ruling Maoist élite. More than one half of the 25 Members and Candidate Members of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (the Politbureau formed at the Ninth Congress in 1969) have disappeared from the political arena; and only two of the five Members of the Politbureau Permanent Committee (known as "the Five") are politically active.

Quite recently, Lin Piao, CC CPC Vice-Chairman and Member of the Politbureau Permanent Committee, was mentioned in the Party Rules as a "close associate" and the "continuer" of the cause of Mao Tse-tung. But the ink had hardly dried when, according to foreign agencies, Lin Piao was declared, following Liu Shao-chi, "a political swindler and a great careerist." The country is still dominated by tension, which, as before, the Maoists are trying to blunt by accelerating their anti-Soviet campaign and whipping up war hysteria.<sup>1</sup>

All this cannot be accounted for merely by the power struggle in the Chinese leadership. Everything seems to indicate that the new crisis was

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<sup>1</sup> One can get an idea of the scope of China's anti-Soviet campaign if one notes, among other things, the fact that in less than 11 months in 1971, the Maoist government mouthpiece, *Jenmin jihpao*, carried about 400 items containing crude attacks on the Soviet Union, and 12 issues of *Hungchi* magazine carried similar material. China's book market is full of anti-Soviet literature; Radio Peking daily broadcasts anti-Soviet slander.

caused by a dispute among the Maoist rulers on questions of domestic and foreign policy.

Being well aware of the dangerous consequences of the Maoist course, Marxist-Leninist parties are seriously concerned with the Chinese problem. They voiced their principled position at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in June, 1969. In this respect the Meeting marked an important stage in the efforts of Marxist-Leninists to strengthen the unity of their revolutionary ranks, to preserve the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory, and to counteract the anti-Leninist and subversive activity of the Maoists.

The 24th Congress of the CPSU, the recent congresses of other Marxist-Leninist parties, the constructive foreign policy of the USSR and the general offensive launched by the forces of socialism against imperialism and reaction—these have once again demonstrated most strikingly the subversive character of the foreign policy course followed by the Maoists, whose aim is to split the world revolutionary movement.

The Chinese splitters and their agents abroad have suffered serious set-backs, and this has compelled them to revise their strategy. Add to this the collapse of the imperialist sabotage against socialism in Czechoslovakia (the intrigues of the anti-socialist forces in that country were approved by the Maoists) and the firm rebuff given to the provocations of the Chinese authorities on the Soviet-Chinese frontier, and it will become clear what forced the Maoists to alter the strategy of conducting subversive activity in the international arena.

The CPSU and other fraternal parties contrast

Peking's disruptive policy with the efforts to cement the unity of the socialist countries, the world communist movement and the anti-imperialist forces, and also with their policy of normalising interstate relations with the Chinese People's Republic. This policy was clearly set forth in the Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress delivered by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, in the speeches of delegates, in the Congress's Resolution on the Report, and in the addresses delivered by the leaders of the fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties to the Congress. The CPSU and the fraternal parties of the socialist countries are ready to promote the all-round development of interstate relations with the CPR without going against their principles and national interests. At the same time the Marxist-Leninist parties are continuing to repel the attacks and expose the ideological platform of the Maoists, a platform which is incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.

Based on a consideration of long-term prospects, this policy of the Marxist-Leninists serves to cement the unity of the international communist movement and the entire anti-imperialist movement, and furthers the cause of socialism in China itself.

Owing to the internationalist stand of the socialist countries in regard to China, to their strong defence of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and to their firm counteraction of the efforts to subvert the socialist states, the world revolutionary movement and the anti-imperialist forces, it became possible to frustrate the plans of the Maoists to set up their own centre for countering the world communist and working-class move-

ment, and in large measure to neutralise the adverse consequences of Peking's policy.

The Maoists have met with serious internal and international obstacles to the achievement of their aims. The adventurism characteristic of Maoism has come sharply into conflict with reality, and this has created the ground for fresh political crises in China. The policy of Mao Tse-tung and his group is facing growing resistance from the working people and members of the Chinese Communist Party. No wonder Mao Tse-tung declared that "it needs another three or four cultural revolutions" to get rid of opposition to the policy of the ruling élite and to strengthen the government, or rather — the military-bureaucratic dictatorship.

The Maoists have failed in their attempts to attain their chauvinistic and hegemonic aims through frontal attacks on the forces which they regard as their chief opponents. Nor did their fabrications about a Soviet military threat produce the hoped-for results.

The fact that the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries are consistently pursuing a policy of promoting genuine normalisation of relations with China causes difficulty for the Maoists and their anti-Soviet propaganda both at home and on the international scene.

*What, then, are the distinctive features of the new Maoist strategy?* The most conspicuous of Peking's new strategems is the change in its foreign-policy slogans. The slogan "Revolution through war or prevention of war through revolution," advanced in the course of the Ninth Congress of the CPC, was replaced in the spring of 1970 by another slogan which says, "The danger

of a new world war still exists, and all nations must be prepared for it. But revolution is now the chief trend in the world." While retaining the slogan of a world war as the most expedient means of resolving the contradictions of today, the Maoists now more frequently speak about their readiness to build relations with all countries, including the socialist ones, on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence." But although Peking is less bellicose in its statements on international issues, it is keeping to its anti-Soviet, anti-socialist direction in its foreign policy activity.

It is noteworthy that among the many capitalist countries that have recently recognised the CPR, those connected with the USA through various military alliances and blocs are displaying particular activeness.

The logical consequence of Peking's new strategy in the international arena is its open rapprochement with the ruling circles of the biggest imperialist states. In 1970 the capitalist market accounted for 82 per cent of the CPR's foreign trade turnover, as compared to only 32 per cent in 1958. These figures speak for themselves. They reveal the reorientation of the CPR's economic ties from the socialist to the capitalist market.

The USA is experiencing great difficulties in connection with the continuing war in Vietnam. It is intensifying its aggression against the peoples of Indochina and accelerating the implementation of its "Vietnamisation" policy. In doing so Washington is trying to use the "Peking card," and the Maoists are again helping the American imperialists to find a way out of the Indochina impasse. What is more, Mao Tse-tung and his

group are starting a new wave of anti-Sovietism to reassure the US rulers about Peking's loyalty.

The Soviet Union has always opposed the isolation of CPR and welcomes the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between China and other countries as well as the restoration of China's rights in the UN. It seems that this could lead to international détente and could make possible the solution of many major problems and the safeguarding of world peace.

Throughout the years the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have steadfastly defended the true interests of China as a socialist country. They have consistently exposed the imperialist policy of isolating and blockading the CPR, and have supported the legitimate demands to restore its rights in the UN by opposing the "two Chinas" policy.

Unfortunately, the very first steps of the Chinese delegation in the UN General Assembly have shown that the Chinese leadership intends to continue in the United Nations anti-Sovietism and its efforts to split the progressive forces. The two speeches made by the leader of the Chinese delegation at the General Assembly bear this out. Peking's obstructive stand on the question of calling a World Disarmament Conference and a conference of the five nuclear powers plays right into the hands of the enemies of peace, says the Bulgarian newspaper *Rabotnichesko Delo*. They are hoping that Peking's cheap demagogic will influence some Third World countries and that the imperialists will thus be able to wreck the Soviet initiatives aimed at establishing peace and security.

The CPSU and the Soviet Government consis-

tently support the normalisation of relations between all countries because this promotes a general improvement of the international climate. At the same time, they have always considered that the development of bilateral relations between states must not interfere with the interests of other countries or proceed at their expense. The policy of improving the entire international situation is the pivot of the peace programme put forward by Comrade Leonid Brezhnev in the Report of the CC CPSU to the 24th Congress, and endorsed by the Congress. The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government towards China is inseparably linked with this general programme. Their objective is to defend the basic interests of the Soviet people, the purity of Marxist-Leninist principles, and the ideals of peace, democracy and communism. The CPSU will never go against its own principles, against the state interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, or against the world revolutionary process and the anti-imperialist struggle.

Recently the Peking leadership has also changed its strategy in its relations with the socialist countries. On the one hand, readiness is expressed to promote interstate relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence." But at the same time, a sixth principle is added, and this provides for interference into the internal affairs of the socialist countries and for "prolonged, irreconcilable, principled struggle."

On October 7, 1969, a Chinese Government statement advanced the following formula: "...Between China and the USSR there are irreconcilable, fundamental differences, and a prin-

cipled struggle between them will continue for a long time. But that should not prevent the maintenance of normal state relations between China and the Soviet Union on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence." This formula was then extended to the CPC's relations with other socialist countries.

By proposing this basis for relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, the Chinese leadership is not only completely ignoring the class approach in international affairs, but also trying to create an international legal "basis" for considering them as non-socialist. Peking maintains that, apart from China itself, only Albania is a genuinely socialist state. And what is more, the Maoists want to exploit normalisation of state relations with the socialist countries (which have not adopted the doctrine of Maoism or approved the "cultural revolution") in order to destroy or undermine their system. So although the Maoists pay lip-service to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which include non-interference in one another's affairs, in actual fact they are trying to legalise their subversive activity against the socialist countries and interference in their internal affairs under the pretext of waging a "principled struggle."

The aims and programme of this struggle are openly expounded in the directive article, "Leninism or Social-Imperialism?" It is an attempt to give "theoretical backing" to the subversion against the USSR and other socialist countries, against the Marxist-Leninist parties and the international collective organisations of the socialist states—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Simi-

lar aims were expressed by the Chinese leadership in its publications on the occasion of the events that took place in Poland in December 1970, in the article of March 18, 1971, marking the centenary of the Paris Commune, and in the article of July 1, 1971, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the CPC.

*Why is Peking resorting to new stratagems?* It is aware of its inability to oppose all the socialist countries at the same time, and to wage a frontal attack against the socialist community combined with the international communist movement. So it decided to employ the strategy expounded in the articles dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the CPC and to Mao Tse-tung's speech "On Our Policy." The essence of such strategy is summed up in what they call "dual tactics." In their jargon this means "fighting spear with spear," "marshalling the forces of active supporters, winning over the intermediate forces and isolating the chief adversaries," "crushing the enemies singly," and "hitting on the head so that the rest crumbles down." In brief, as the Peking social chauvinists step up their subversive activity against the socialist countries, they are trying to take an individual approach to these countries, carefully studying the specific situation in each of them and the state of their relations with the Soviet Union. Nor is Peking niggardly with its promises of economic benefits and credits for separate socialist countries provided they are "neutral" in the major dispute between the international communist movement and the CPC leaders, and provided they loosen their ties with the Soviet Union. That is how the Peking leaders are trying to expand the channels for their ideological penetration of

the socialist countries. They aim to turn them into an instrument of its policy, and ultimately to undermine or weaken the unity and might of the socialist system and isolate the USSR as much as possible. This line is reminiscent of the "bridge building" stratagem by means of which imperialism has long been trying to weaken the unity of the socialist community and "erode" it from within.

Besides, there are other benefits which the Chinese leadership hopes to get by means of its new strategy. For example, it wants the normalisation of interstate relations between the CPR and the socialist countries to be presented as a victory for the "ideas of Mao Tse-tung" and a justification of the course charted by the Ninth Congress of the CPC.

But something else betrays the treachery of the Maoist "dual tactics." This is that, despite all the efforts of the fraternal parties, the Chinese leadership (while proclaiming fictitious anti-imperialist slogans) vigorously opposes unity of action in the struggle against imperialism. This, in effect, helps the imperialists in their attempts to mount a counter-offensive against the revolutionary movement in one area or another. An example of this is provided by the events in Indochina and also by the increasing efforts of the reactionary forces to undermine the progressive regimes in a number of Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Peking has not only kept its global strategy against the Soviet Union unchanged, but is constantly deepening and "theoretically substantiating" it. Having rejected the Marxist assessment of the major contradictions of today, and the

class conception of the balance of forces in the world, the Maoist politicians now contend that the chief contradiction is the one between the two "superpowers" (the USSR and the USA) on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other. The slogan of combating "the hegemony of the two superpowers" has become the banner under which the Chinese leadership is trying once again to build up a bloc consisting of the "small and medium-sized" states, irrespective of their socio-economic systems. This slogan is an extension of the Maoists' anti-Marxist schemes about the "intermediate zones" and the division of all states into "rich" and "poor," and is obviously devised to justify their anti-Soviet policy. Under the pretext of fighting "the two superpowers," the Maoists are discarding the idea of the confrontation of the two systems. Instead they equate socialism and capitalism, and in this way try to attain hegemony.

Peking's present foreign policy doctrine consists, on the one hand, in manoeuvring within the USSR-USA-Japan-China "quadrangle"—in increasing the contradictions between the USSR, the USA and Japan for the sake of its own selfish, great-power chauvinist aims; and, on the other hand, in urging various states (including developing, capitalist and some socialist ones) to fight what it calls the "hegemony of the two superpowers," directing their attack mainly against the Soviet Union—the bulwark of socialism, world peace and security. Chinese representatives emphasise that this platform is the basis for a rapprochement with the CPR, that it is on this basis that China is ready to improve relations with any country, regardless of its system.

The Maoist leadership is trying hard to find allies in the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, counting on the nationalist sentiments and extremist groupings in some of them. It has begun to step up diplomatic and economic relations with the developing countries, using more flexible methods and avoiding blatant intervention in their internal affairs or open imposition of Maoist ideas.

A new feature of Chinese tactics designed to win the sympathy of the Third World was the revision in 1970 of the formerly hostile attitude towards the "movement of the non-aligned countries" and the endeavour to subject its interests to China's hegemonic policy. It is these aims that prompted the Chinese leadership to capitalise on the slogan of struggle against "the two super-powers" and to attempt to separate the Third World countries from their reliable support in the anti-imperialist struggle—to separate them from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

Hegemonic aspirations are also the factor that determines the attitude of the Peking leadership towards the problem of Indochina. Recent events are increasingly exposing its strategic goals in Indochina and its double-dealing policy. Everything seems to indicate that the Maoists are intent on strengthening their position in this region. If we were to uncover the real motive behind their manoeuvres, it would be plain that they are meant to show the US rulers that "the key to the solution of the Indochina problem lies in Peking," and to belittle the importance of the initiatives of the Vietnamese patriots for a political settlement. This gives the US Administration

the opportunity to ignore the constructive proposals put forward by the delegation of the South Vietnam Provisional Revolutionary Government and fully supported by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and by the progressive and peace forces of the world.

In order to win the confidence of the Arabs and to strengthen its position in the Middle East, Peking now prefers not to voice open objections against a political settlement of the crisis there. Yet it continues to give active support to the extremist elements there which oppose any political settlement.

The CPR leadership is dead against all the initiatives of the socialist states for a détente in Europe. It sharply opposed the Soviet and Polish agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, and the West Berlin talks. Its propaganda discredits the idea of strengthening European security and does everything possible to interfere with efforts to attain this end.

By opposing the Soviet proposals to hold a conference of the five nuclear powers and a World Disarmament Conference, the Chinese Government has proved itself to be an opponent of détente.

Peking is now trying to bring its attitude to the international communist movement into line with its new foreign policy strategy. It wants to counterpose the various anti-Soviet political forces and revisionist elements of all hues, both Right and "Left," to the tendency towards growing unity among the communist forces. That is why the pursuance of the ideals of the working class and of scientific socialism today requires firm

action against all these enemies of Marxism-Leninism.

The Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1969 has crippled the hegemonic plans of the CPC leaders. Having completely failed to turn the pro-Chinese groups in other countries into influential political parties or to unite them into something resembling an international trend, the Chinese leadership have made another attempt to win over individual Communist parties or at least to persuade them not to make any public criticism of its ideology and policy. With this aim in view, Chinese propaganda and official CPC representatives have concentrated on slandering the CPSU's home and foreign policies and the situation in the USSR and the socialist community in front of foreign communists. At the same time any pretext is used to kindle nationalism and anti-Sovietism among the ranks of the communist movement and the national liberation movement.

In its efforts to subject the revolutionary movement and the national liberation drive to its hegemonic aims, Maoism is managing to confuse some revolutionaries and trying to direct struggle, not against the real enemies, but against the Soviet Union and the Communist parties which are actively defending Marxism-Leninism and the unity of all revolutionary forces.

The Maoist strategy can be summed up as follows: Wherever there is hope of influencing the leadership of Communist parties, the Maoists readily abandon their own direct supporters; in countries where they come up against strong resistance, they increase their support for the pro-Maoist, break-away groups and "parties," spend

large sums on maintaining their network of political agents, and engage in direct political attacks on the Communist parties in those countries.

As for the patently pro-Maoist parties, they have recently been considerably weakened. Having taken the political course dictated by Peking, they found themselves in a most awkward situation. For example, there were some Communist parties whose leadership blindly followed Maoist dogmas. This led to the serious defeat of the revolutionary forces in the countries concerned, while the parties themselves lost contact with the masses, forfeited worker and peasant support, and degenerated into conspiratorial sects maintained by Peking.

It is characteristic that in fighting the Communist parties of capitalist countries, Peking even makes use of its contacts with the ruling bourgeois parties. For example, the Chinese leaders demanded that representatives of the Japanese Communist Party should be excluded from the Parliamentary Association which is trying to establish diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and that communist parliamentarians should not be included in parliamentary delegations sent to China. That is how the Peking leadership is taking revenge on the Communist Party of Japan for its criticism of Maoist adventurism in the international arena and for its principled stand towards the notorious "cultural revolution."

The international policy of the Chinese leadership has demonstrated that Maoism sharply conflicts with the anti-imperialist platform formulated at the International Meeting of June 1969.

Maoism is one of the most dangerous adversaries of Marxism in the history of the revolution-

ary movement. The danger stems largely from the fact that Maoism is a political practice which exploits the aspirations of the masses for socialism and which relies for ideological support on the eclecticism of "Mao Tse-tung ideas," the political prestige of the Chinese revolution and the CPC, the state machinery, and the economic, military and other resources of the world's most populous country.

Maoist slogans sometimes find some response among certain quarters in the Third World and among young extremists in the capitalist countries, and are taken up and spread by opportunists. This is due largely to the fact that the public in these countries, not knowing the true nature of Maoism, mistakes the revolutionary rhetoric of Maoism for a genuine revolutionary spirit and concern for the interests of the fighting peoples. But deeper knowledge of Maoism dispels these illusions and proves it to be basically incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and scientific socialism, and with the interests of the struggle for national liberation.

The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1969 emphasised that combating the theory and practice of Maoism is one of the most important internationalist tasks of all the Marxist-Leninist parties and the world revolutionary movement.

In order to expose the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist nature of Maoism, it is essential to consider some of its specific features:

— Maoism disguises its real essence with Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary phraseology in order to deceive the Chinese people, who, because of the existing conditions in the CPR, are unable to

learn about the works and views of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and so accept Mao's "ideas" as the "pinnacle of Marxist thought;"

— the Maoists take a purely pragmatical approach to the question of theory, regarding it as an instrument for furthering their great-power policy. The Maoists unscrupulously change their political declarations and stratagems, according to the dictates of practical needs and the concrete situation, but always spearhead the attack against Marxism-Leninism, the communist movement and the socialist community, particularly the Soviet Union. The ideological and political platform of Maoism is designed to realise the hegemonic aspirations of the CPC's nationalistic leadership;

— Maoism's eclecticism makes it manifold. It is a hotchpotch of "ideas" that can be adapted to the most diverse needs. That is why "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" suit the ultra-Left "revolutionaries," the extremists and Trotskyists, and the Right opportunists alike. Maoist ideas are utilised by outright anti-communists and anti-Sovietists such as Klaus Mehnert, Benjamin Schwartz and Edgar Snow. Maoism makes active use of the various anti-communist trends and of revisionism of all hues to attack scientific socialism.

The anti-Leninist ideological and political platform of the Maoists appeared in the late 1950's and took concrete shape after Peking's extensive political and ideological campaign against the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.

Criticism of Maoism should take account of the great gap existing between Mao's published articles, which foster the myth that he is an "outstanding Marxist-Leninist," and his actual views. These latter betray themselves in the actual poli-

cy and activity of the present Chinese leadership. Mao Tse-tung's articles and speeches are reportedly published after thorough revision, after "they have been flavoured with Marxism-Leninism," as he himself says. The Maoists deliberately exploit for their selfish aims the authoritative ideas of scientific socialism, using them to conceal the unscientific, anti-Marxist character of the ideas of the "great helmsman." On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung has adopted many true postulates regarding the strategy, tactics and driving forces of the Chinese revolution, having borrowed them from the documents of the Communist International and from works by veterans of the fraternal parties (including some Chinese). It is the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties, not Mao Tse-tung, that are to be credited with the verified conclusions and appraisals concerning such basic issues as the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal nature of the Chinese revolution, the important role in it of the peasantry, the significance of the revolutionary army and armed struggle in China, and the tactics of a unified national front.

In order to keep "Mao Tse-tung's ideas" "unrivalled," all the works of the well-known Chinese propagandists of Marxism—Li Ta-chao, Chu Chiu-po, Teng Chung-hsia, Wang Ming, Chang Wen-tien and others—have been destroyed; some of these authors are being constantly discredited, while others are intentionally buried in oblivion. This enables the Maoists to portray Mao Tse-tung as the great "theorist," "strategist and tactician" of the Chinese revolution.

The Maoists are thus giving Mao Tse-tung undeserved credit for elaborating the fundamental

principles regarding the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution, completely ignoring the decisive role in it of the advice and recommendation of the Communist International and of the CPSU's experience. It is essential to distinguish the "ideas" which really belong to Mao Tse-tung from the correct precepts on which Maoism is merely capitalising in order to conceal its own anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist essence.

The importance of the struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism is becoming more and more obvious today because of the emergence of a kind of "unified ideological front" extending from "Left" and Right opportunism to diehard anti-communism. Today the most varied political forces—the imperialists, Maoists, nationalists, revisionists of all shades, and bellicose Zionists—are acting together in a single camp against Marxist-Leninist teachings, the communist movement and the socialist community. Mao Tse-tung and his group, who pose as ultra—"revolutionaries," are actually in alliance with Right revisionists and undisguised anti-communists such as Herbert Marcuse, Milovan Djilas, Klaus Mehnert, Ernst Fischer and Zbigniew Brzezinsky.

We often see Western ideologists, disguised as "defenders" of humanism and democracy, systematically accusing the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of mythical "violations of democracy and the principles of humanism," whitewashing the criminal acts committed by the Maoists during the "cultural revolution." They depict the cultural revolution as an "outburst of indignation against bureaucracy," as an attempt to "renovate socialism," and as a "search for Asian democracy." These "democrats" said noth-

ing when Mao Tse-tung and his adherents dealt with well-known Chinese writers, actors and artists and with thousands of communists and revolutionaries. They say nothing when the Maoists exile hundreds of thousands of people to concentration camps called "labour reformatories" and persecute intellectuals. Nor have they reacted to Mao Tse-tung's policy of genocide in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and South China.

To strengthen ties with the above-mentioned anti-Marxist "united front" and slacken the effectiveness of the principled criticism of the Maoist order by Marxist-Leninist parties, the Peking leaders are increasingly issuing invitations to Western literary men, correspondents and numerous delegations. For instance, in the autumn of 1970, the CPR was visited by Edgar Snow, the "chronicler" of Maoism. Peking insistently invites bourgeois journalists to China and works on them diligently so they would depict the situation in China in a way favourable to the Maoists. Chinese officials have suddenly become very talkative and great lovers of heart-to-heart discussions over a cup of tea with American, West German and Japanese bourgeois journalists, hoping to be favoured with wide publicity of their views and their numerous verbal attacks against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It is not surprising that on returning home these visitors whitewash the "cultural revolution," portraying it as the "purposeful struggle of the masses."

Motivated by time-serving considerations and a desire to enter into contact with Peking, even some progressive papers have recently carried publications playing down the disastrous effect of the "cultural revolution," and describing the

present situation in China as a socialist "country-wide experiment." The authors of these publications want to create the impression that Chinese society is undergoing "all-round development" and that the standard of living of the Chinese peasant and worker are rising; they compare the "people's communes" to the agricultural co-operatives existing in the socialist countries and so on. But what they call "objective information" is often just mere repetition of official Maoist propaganda meant to mislead readers.

Right opportunists are also trying to form an alliance with the Maoists in the onslaught against Marxism-Leninism by making up to Peking and embellishing its policy and the "cultural revolution." One of the originators of this trend is Roger Garaudy, expelled from the French Communist Party for his anti-party activities. In his writings he presents the theory and practice of Maoism as a "model of backward socialism" which he says is the logical product of the development of Chinese society.

The ideological battle being waged by the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties forces the Maoists to assume a defensive position, change their tactics, and adapt themselves to the new situation. This principled struggle offers effective moral and political support to the genuine communists of China and to those Chinese people, who are striving to redirect their country along the socialist path.

While consistently combating the chauvinist course of the Maoists, the CPSU is constantly educating the Soviet people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and patriotism. Soviet people have the greatest respect for the Chinese

people and their culture. Despite the anti-Soviet hysteria in China, the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society in the USSR is still functioning actively. It is in the USSR, and not in China, that the classics of Chinese literature are being studied and the works of Lu Hsin, Lao She, Mao Tun, T'an Han and many other leading Chinese novelists, playwrights and poets are being widely published. It was not present-day China, but Moscow, that celebrated the anniversary of Sun Yat-sen and held exhibitions of paintings by Hsu Pei-hung, Chi Pai-shin and other Chinese artists. These facts serve to expose the Maoist claims that the Soviet Union conducts "anti-Chinese propaganda."

In his address to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969, CC CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev said: "We do not identify the declarations and actions of the present Chinese leadership with the aspirations, wishes and true interests of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. We are deeply convinced that China's genuine national renaissance, and its socialist development, will be best served not by struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, against the whole communist movement, but by alliance and fraternal co-operation with them."

The Soviet stand towards the Chinese People's Republic was reaffirmed at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. While consistently following the course mapped out by the Congress, the Party continues to be steadfast in exposing the anti-Soviet policy of the Maoists and their anti-Leninist, nationalist ideology, and to stave off Peking's encroachments upon the national interests of the Soviet Union, and upon the unity and cohesion

of the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement. The CPSU is pursuing a stable policy of normalising interstate relations between the USSR and the CPR.

In its resolution "On the International Activity of the CC CPSU After the 24th Congress of the CPSU," the November (1971) Plenum of the CC CPSU affirmed that the "Politbureau is consistently pursuing the policy of the 24th Congress in relations with the Chinese People's Republic." The Plenum expressed "complete agreement with the Politbureau's position in resolving the relevant practical questions," and noted with satisfaction that "the foreign policy course of the CC CPSU enjoys the full understanding and unanimous support of all communists and the entire Soviet people. Therein lies the main strength of the CPSU's international policy."

The situation today and the present onslaught of the Chinese leadership against Marxism-Leninism, and against the unity of the Marxist-Leninist parties and of the socialist countries, urgently demand still greater efforts in all areas of the ideological struggle against Maoism, so that peace, democracy and socialism may triumph.

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